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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
suits the situation at hand rather than implied contracts. Quasi
contracts are in reality not contracts at all since they do not rest
upon a meeting of intentions, expressed by words or by conduct,
but are obligations created by a legal fiction in order to do justice.
Bicknell v. Garrett, 1 Wash.2d 564, 96 P.2d 592 (1939). This legal
fiction was invented by the common law courts in order to permit
a recovery in an action of assumpsit in cases where there is in fact
no contract, but the circumstances are such that under the law of
natural justice there should be a recovery as though there had been
a promise. Clark v. People's Say. & L. Ass"n, 221 Ind. 168, 46
N.E.2d 681 (1943). The West Virginia court draws this distinction
between implied contracts and quasi contracts in Johnson v. Nat'l,
Bank, 124 W. Va. 157, 19 S.E.2d 441 (1942).
There seems to be no theory under which P could recover the
500 from D. At the time collections were made by D there was
a valid outstanding obligation to H owing by P, and payment to the
agent is without doubt payment to the principal. The only ques-
tionable payment made was that of P to H to secure the release of
the trust deed upon P's property, and this transaction in no way
involved D. The court states that it was not here concerned with
P's right to recover from H. Admittedly the result of the court's
decision is correct, and merely a secondary basis for so holding is
questionable, though firmly substantiated under the doctrine of
stare decisis. It is submitted that the court should overrule the
precedents and abolish the unreasonable distinction between mis-
takes of law and of fact.
H. C. B., Jr.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-REPRSENTATIVE CAPACITY.-P filed a
declaration suing Ds, "as trustees of' a certain union. Ds, by a
special plea, alleged that the process was served against them as
individuals, so that to suffice, the action had to be against all the
members of the union. The court cited Milan v. Settle, 127 W. Va.
270, 20 S.E.2d 269 (1944), indicating that the failure to use "as"
showed a desire to sue Ds in individual capacity. Since "as" was
present in this declaration and since the court found the action to
be against Ds in their representative capacity, it would seem that
the use of "as" denotes, to the court's satisfaction, the intent to sue
one in his representative capacity. However, the court went on
to hold that the capacity of a plaintiff or defendant in a suit is
"to be determined from all the allegations of the pleading."
Marion v. Chandler, 81 S.E.2d 89 (W .Va. 1954).
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These two lines of reasoning seem contradictory since one can
easily conceive of the situation where "as" could be used and the
remainder of the pleadings indicate the desire to bind either the
plaintiff or the defendant in his individual capacity. If this were
the case the court would have to apply one or the other doctrine.
They can only be consistently used together where, as in this case,
"as" is used and the allegations go to prove an action against the
party in his representative capacity.
Each line of reasoning has found support in prior decisions
in our jurisdiction. These seem to lend themselves toward division
into certain groups. The largest group examined shows a failure
to use "as". In each of these situations the court has decided that
the action was an individual one. However, various reasons were
given for these decisions. In Milan v. Settle, supra, the court held
that issuance of process against defendants "members" of a union
to be solely against the individuals named as defendants, in their
personal capacity, as distinguished from any representative capacity
in connection with the union, and that the use of the name of the
union was merely descriptio personae. At page 277 the court said,
"The word 'as' is of importance in such cases, and the failure to
use it in this instance indicates to us that the individual defendants
were not intended to be sued in any representative capacity." In
both Hyman v. Swint, 94 W. Va. 627, 119 S.E. 866 (1923), and
Donahue v. Rafferty, 82 W. Va. 535, 96 S.E. 935 (1918), the court
considered a deed conveying land to "Right Reverend P. J.
Donahue, Bishop of Wheeling, W. Va." as vesting title in the bishop
individually. In Pinnell v. Hinkle, 54 W. Va. 119, 46 S.E. 371
(1904), the court said, "A summons from a justice is against 'B. L.
Hinkle, guardian for Joseph E. and Mary Friend, infants.' It is
an action against Hinkle as an individual." In Crim v. England,
46 W. Va. 480, 35 S.E. 887 (1899), notes given by Bradford and
Brown to satisfy a demand against the estate of one Trahern, and
signed by Bradford and Brown, "Administrators of James Trahern,
Deceased" failed to show the right of the payee to go against the
estate. The phrase in quotations was held to be descriptio per-
sonae. In State for Use of Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Hudkins,
34 W. Va. 370, 12 S.E. 495 (1890), the court said, "without the
use of the particle 'as' simply placing his office in opposition (sic)
to the name of the individual has been held to be merely descriptio
personae." In Fidelity Ins. Trust &c Safe Deposit Co. v. Shenandoah
Valley R.R., 33 W. Va. 761, 11 S.E. 58 (1890), an attachment against
"William Milnes, Jr., president Shenandoah Valley Railroad Com.
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pany garnishee" was held not to be a garnishment against the com-
pany but against Milnes personally. A negotiable note signed
"J. B., Agent for Lewis County" was considered to be the note of
J. B. and not that of the county in Exchange Bank of Virginia v.
County of Lewis, 28 W. Va. 273 (1886). Finally, a bill of exchange
signed "Chas. F. Hale, Pres." was held to be Hale's personal note
in Rand Qx Minsker v. Hale, 3 W. Va. 495 (1869). These cases tend
to show that mere failure to use "as" renders the process, note, etc.,
personal. However, the next two cases indicate that the court
will look for more signs.
In Drainer v. Travis, 116 W. Va. 390, 180 S.E. 435 (1935), the
court said, "The words 'executor of G. B. Travis estate', without
more, are merely descriptive of the person of the defendant."
(Italics supplied.) In Thompson &c Lively v. Mann, 53 W. Va. 432,
44 S.E. 246 (1903), a judgment against "T. G. Mann, administrator
of Sherman Clarkson, deceased", as shown in the caption was con-
sidered to be an individual judgment against Mann, "it not appear-
ing that the recovery was to be levied on goods and chattels of
Clarkson in the hands of Mann to be administered." (Italics
supplied.) These cases leave open the questions raised by the
italicized portions.
The next group of cases is akin to the preceding cases in that
"as" was omitted in these also and the persons named were affected
in their individual capacity. These differ, however, in a sense,
because the court applies the second line of reasoning used in the
instant case, i.e., the determination of capacity is based on the sum
total of the allegations. In Scott v. Newell, 69 W. Va. 118, 70 S.E.
1092 (1911), the court held that the words "Trustees of the First
Presbyterian Church of Chester, W. Va." were not "of themselves,
sufficient to determine the question whether they have been sued
in their official capacity." The court felt that the words "may have
been used only as descriptio personae." They went on to say,
"The character of the declaration, its allegations, must determine
the character in which a party sues, or is sued." They decided
here that the parties were sued in their individual capacity. In
Hall v. McGregor, 65 W. Va. 74, 64 S.E. 736 (1909), a judgment
against Matilda McGregor, executrix of the last will and testament
of David McGregor, deceased, was considered personal. The words
after Matilda McGregor were thought to be descriptive. The
court went on to state that "by reason of the very substance of
the cause of action" the action was one against her in her individual
capacity. In Hanson v. Blake, 63 W. Va. 560, 60 S.E. 589 (1908),
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where there were proceedings against Blake, "administrator of
Charles Lomadew, deceased," the court considered the action to be
one against Blake individually. The words quoted were "rejected
as mere surplusage." The court said however, that "were the
declaration against the estate which defendant represents, and the
promises declared upon those of the person he represents, then
such words would be properly used as necessary to set forth the
representative capacity in which defendant is sued."
In the following two cases a seemingly altogether different
approach was utilized by the court. "As" was omitted but was
necessary to fulfill the obligations of the process and so the court,
itself, corrected the defect, treating it as a mere technicality. In
Haller v. Digman, 113 W. Va. 240, 167 S.E. 593 (1933) a judgment
against M. M. Haller "as" guardian was desired, though the "as"
was omitted in the judgment of the lower court. The supreme
court called the defect a formal one and said that it was correctable
by the justice's court. In Selvey's Ex'rs v. Armstrong's Adm'r, 73
W. Va. 13, 79 S.E. 1020 (1913), the court refused to reverse the
lower court which rendered a judgment lacking the phrase "to be
levied on the goods and chattels of Adolphus Armstrong in his
hands to be administered." The judgment was against Kunst,
Armstrong's administrator. The court felt that this omission made
the judgment a personal one but the court found the defect only
formal and made the correction in its judgment.
In Goff v. Lowe, 101 W. Va. 57, 131 S.E. 870 (1926), the court
used a similar approach. A declaration alleging that plaintiffs
"doing business as the Roane Realty Company, complain," was
held to be an averment alleging partnership although it was
stated that the proper averment would be a direct statement that
plaintiffs are partners.
The remaining cases examined on the proposition of deter-
mining capacity do not fit in any of the categories heretofore
mentioned. However they are as much concerned with the problem
as the others discussed.
Massey v. Payne, 109 W. Va. 529, 115 S.E. 658 (1930), would
appear to be directly contra to the Milan case, supra, and hardly
in accord with the others cited in the first group. However, it
would seem to be in accord with the Scott and Hall cases. The
court felt that the allegations in the declaration did not make a
case against the defendants in their representative capacity, but
that the substance and effect of the allegations were to charge them
personally. Accordingly the words "as trustees under" were regarded
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as merely descriptia personae and surplusage. Yet in Thurmand
v. Guyan Valley Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 501, 102 S.E. 221 (1920),
plaintiffs sued "in their said capacity of executors of the last will
and testament of W. D. Thurmond, deceased," and the court said
that "the whole tenor of the declaration shows that plaintiffs are
suing in a representative character." The fourth point of the
syllabus says that "Whether the plaintiff has instituted an action
in a representative or individual capacity, and whether words
following his name are to be deemed descriptive of his person or
of the character in which he sues, is to be determined from all
the allegations of the pleading." This agrees in substance with the
Scott and Hall cases, supra, but it appears that if the court had so
desired it could have followed the reasoning in the Milan and
Hudkins cases, supra, and arrived at the same result.
The last two cases to be discussed have been criticized in pre-
vious case comments. Hardesty v. Fairmont Supply Co., 123 W.
Va. 161, 14 S.E.2d 436 (1941), is analyzed in 48 W. VA. L.Q. 72
(1941), and Hughes v. Charlton, 104 W. Va. 640, 141 S.E. 1 (1927),
is commented on in 34 W. VA. L.Q. 397 (1928). In the Hardesty
case, the grantee of a deed was described as "Robert C. Miller,
Receiver of The National Bank of Fairmont, an insolvent national
banking association." The court held that Miller's heirs took
title on his death. In the Charlton case, supra, Charlton, "Trustee",
contracted to buy the stock in a certain corporation. The court
held that the use of the term "trustee" was not merely descriptio
personae but was used advisedly and the vendors should have been
put on notice that the vendee was contracting only as trustee, not
individually. This case seems squarely contra to the first group
of cases cited. The court was split three-two on this proposition
and no authority was cited for the majority opinion. However,
it came up on the equity side of the court. In effect, "as" was
omitted and representative capacity found. This seems to be the
only case so holding in West Virginia.
P. M. F.
PLEADING-WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION-IMPROPER TO INCLUDE
CLAIM FOR PROPERTY DAmAGE.-P'S decedent instituted action to
recover from D for personal injuries and for damage to his automo-
bile sustained in a collision with D's vehicle. He died pending trial
from these injuries and P, decedent's administratrix, was allowed to
revive the action in her name. Trial court instructed the jury that
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